Where does international justice draw its authority in an international scene largely driven by self-regulated professional markets for the settlement of transnational disputes? To revisit this classical debate, this article connects the professional and social structure of dispute settlement mechanisms to their social credibility among users of international justice. Drawing on extensive biographical databases, it suggests that the growth of investor-state disputes is favoring a shift from a professional market shaped by scholarly insiders to one dominated by corporate legal elites. It links this dynamic of the field to the contrasted development of a scholarly meritocracy of international litigators, and the model of the Wall Street law firm which is sustaining the continuous expansion of private arbitration. These changes are further reflected in dynamics of alignments, within the wider marketplace of users of international justice, to structural changes in the global economy that favor the expansion of flexible strategies of dispute settlement.
INTRODUCTION
With the increased traction of international justice in global affairs in the last years, there has been a growing interest for international lawyers and the role they play to sustain the authority of international dispute settlement mechanisms.
1 Legal debates classically emphasized the legitimating role played by this 'invisible college' of international lawyers, who operate for the most part within self-regulated professional markets. When coined in the 1970s, the term referred to a then small cluster of predominantly law professors. 2 Since then, there has been a dramatic acceleration of the pace of institutionalization of the international scene, and with it a growth of the marketplace for international justice. 3 Arguably, the most spectacular transformation has been the expansion of international investment arbitration from the 1990s.
With these changes, the role of international lawyers has been increasingly under fire. The 'club' of international arbitrators 4 is seen to be turning international arbitration into an echo chamber of corporate interests; 5 for its part, the 'Western monopoly' over the 'international bar' of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is considered to be hampering the authority of the ICJ as a world court. 6 A major difficulty with these accounts is that they tend to reproduce -albeit in the form of a criticism -discourses that are produced by professionals of international justice themselves. 7 Typically they channel the attention towards the rhetoric that sustains the distribution of professional positions in international law along distinct functional, institutional and normative divisions of labor, predominantly between the so-called 'public' side of international justice (inter-state adjudication) and the 'private' side of international justice, dealing with transnational business disputes. Thus, where private international lawyers emphasize the ethical selfregulation of international arbitrators, 8 debates in public international law pinpoint the detrimental effects of the fragmentation of international law.
To go beyond these oppositions, this article argues that it is necessary to move away from the professional and institutional categories that these discourses draw on. It emphasizes rather the correlation between the professional markets for international justice, and the social credibility of international dispute settlement mechanisms. Its cue is that mapping the social spaces in which professionals of international justice are situated can help account for the authority, over time, of international justice institutions. Focusing on the structural characteristics of the marketplaces for international justice can provide a key, furthermore, to explain current dynamics of change that remain otherwise obscured in existing accounts.
Reflecting the prominence taken by disputes between states and corporations over 'mega politics,' 9 recent debates have noted the growing convergence between the two sides of international justice. Emblematically, core institutions of investment arbitration like the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) are moving towards 'treaty-based' arbitration, and there is an increased circulation of rules across forums of international justice. In the face of mounting criticisms against investment arbitration, this is notably seen as favoring a 'return of the state' in high stakes disputes between states and corporations. 10 Focused, however, predominantly on procedural rules and existing institutional divides between public and private international justice, these accounts do not help explain the empirical drivers that lead either to the 'fragmentation' of international law, or its 'harmonization;' 11 nor do they help assessing their wider impact on the authority of international justice.
By contrast, this article recalls the characteristic of international justice as a market for 'symbolic goods' 12 -a characterization rendered all the more relevant given the absence, on the international scene, of a normative hierarchy and top-down regulation of professions of international justice. The authority, therefore, of international justice institutions is derived as much from the belief in international dispute-settlement mechanisms among audiences of users, foremost states and corporations, as it is driven by professional competition. Building on a structural sociology approach, this paper correlates the characteristics of professionals of international justice -their juridical, but also political, economic and social resources -to their capacity to respond to, and refract, the interests of these external constituencies. In doing so, it documents a dramatic shift, within the 'invisible college' of international law: the move from a professional marketplace of international justice privileging scholarly insiders to one dominated by multinational corporate law firms. More than anecdotal, this shift has a direct import for the authority of international justice. Indeed it is favoring the prominence of a model of production and reproduction of legal practice and professional hierarchies -that of the 'Wall street law firm'-which is particularly well positioned to wage multi-front legal wars according to the interests of clients, and could thus be contributing to the continuous fragmentation of international law. But this model is also a powerful engine for the co-optation of emerging global-trade oriented legal elites from the Global South 13 into flexible, segmented, marketplaces for international justice. Beyond a disruption of the divide between public and private international justice therefore, it is the whole structure of international justice itself that may be gradually shifting.
To flesh out this thesis, this article proceeds in three steps. The first section briefly describes the research strategy. This involved a necessarily broad purview. To trace the transformation, over time, of the social and professional structure of international justice, this article takes on the challenge of considering together both sides of international justice -public and private -to underscore their parallel and competing development. The second section connects this social history of international justice to the professional monopolies that gradually emerged around the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for inter-state adjudication on the one hand, and the market for commercial arbitration on the other hand. The description of the differentiated development of these two sides of international justice leads to a tentative conclusion. Building on empirical data that had yet to be compiled, detailing the profiles of judges and counsels before the ICJ and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), this empirical analysis indeed suggests that contrary to prevailing accounts 14 the professional and social structure of the market for inter-state adjudication corroborates the symbolic authority of the ICJ as a world court. However, the dynamic of development of this marketplace, that is, its internal differentiation, has also fostered its insulation from political and economic interests, and this is rendering it increasingly vulnerable to outside pressure -be it political backlash or the professional competition of multinational corporate law firms. By contrast, the capacity of adaptation (and alignment) of the latter with corporate and political interests helps explain the dynamic of growth and continuous expansion of international commercial arbitration, including towards investor-state disputes from the 1990s. It is this contrasted dynamic that accounts for what the final section sees as an ongoing transformation of the structure of the field of international justice. It suggests that the dynamic of this shift is reinforcing the prominence of the model of the 'Wall street law firm,' which radically differs from the erstwhile 'invisible college.'
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A MARKET FOR SYMBOLIC GOODS
Taking on the characteristic of international justice as a market for symbolic goods shifts the focus towards the dynamic relationship between the restricted professional markets of producers of international law and the enlarged markets of users of international justice.
Focusing on this dynamic relationship between producers and users of international justice is a way to connect the development of international justice mechanisms to wider contextual political and economic variables. 15 Highlighting the fragility of the symbolic authority of international justice institutions, this also underscores that their sustainability depends on the capacity to invest continuously in the reproduction of the belief in their authority. In this relation with users of international justice, the channels of (re)production of legal knowledge and legal hierarchies play a central role. In this process, the insiders of the 'international bar' of the ICJ or the 'club'
of private arbitration hold a commanding position. They control all the more the rules and practices of these mechanisms of international justice that they have contributed to their shaping.
Yet, these insiders must also respond to the specific interests of the wider professional markets who act as their correspondents, referents or potential users at the national level.
To trace this dynamic relation, this article builds on the hypothesis of a 'field' of international justice. This analytical tool refers to a relatively autonomous social microcosm, made up of professional networks and hierarchical relationships, and types of resources that determine the rules of the game and status within the space, all of which can change over time. 16 This hypothesis echoes earlier studies that have underscored the common genesis of public and private international justice institutions at the turn of the twentieth century. 17 Going back to these initial encounters is a way to trace connections over time within the field, 18 including the drivers of professional competition and their effects on the structure of the field.
Empirically, the research strategy focused on professionals involved in inter-state adjudication (the PCIJ and the ICJ) on the one hand, and in international private arbitration,
whether institutional (such as the ICSID and the Chamber of arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris -ICC) or ad hoc. It aimed at gaining some knowledge about the social and professional characteristics of the agents involved in these two sides of international justice. Two sets of qualitative data were gathered. The first purported to map out the hierarchical structures that determine access and status within these marketplaces by looking at the resources of the agents invested in them -legal, political, social, economic, but also familialand by tracing the national and international components of their professional trajectories. This was done by building a unique biographical database of 135 individual profiles of international judges and counsels associated with the PCIJ and the ICJ on the one hand, 19 and by relying on the findings of earlier studies on the growth of international arbitration from the 1980s on the other hand. The defining characteristic of these repeat-players is also that their scholarly credentials are essentially meritocratic. This suggests that, compared to their earlier counterparts, access to this small marketplace is no longer defined by resources drawn from outside the field, be they political, economic or social. For example, the profile of Ian Brownlie, described as the 'dean of (the) practitioners' before the ICJ from the mid-1980s, contrasts markedly with that of Sir This gradual internal differentiation of the marketplace for inter-state adjudication reflects in great part external variables. After their relative success during the 'Geneva episode' of the inter-war period, the international justice mechanisms created during the first two decades of the twentieth century remained very much a sideshow in global politics. The ICJ survived in the shadow of Cold war and decolonization politics with a meek, at times empty, docket, especially following the shunning of the court by newly independent states after a number of controversial decisions. 36 These external drivers help explain the retreat into an Ivory tower of the international bar of the ICJ. 37 Their correlate distancing from political and economic interests certainly contributed to the gradual autonomization of this small marketplace from national diplomacies. But this also suggests that it fostered their insulation from wider transformations on the international scene and the global economy.
These two models of learned practitioners indeed point to the dynamics of reproduction of access and status within this small meritocratic elite. This dynamic helps account, somewhat contradictorily, for both the formidable -though symbolic -revival of the ICJ from the 1980s, and the limited capacity of this restricted marketplace to deflect external shocks. These dynamics of reproduction, indeed, are defined around mentor-pupil relations at a cluster of European academic centers, like the Chichele Chair of Public international law at Oxford, which along with the Whewell Chair at Cambridge are incubators of international litigators from the UK, or the Université de droit of Paris-Ouest Nanterre around Alain Pellet in France. 38 As noted by a young recruit into this small milieu, 'any caste must organize the conditions of its own survival.' 39 The corollary of the limited demand for public international justice and the peripheral position of this nutshell of learned practitioners has been the constitution of this professional space into a restricted, meritocratic space, with scholarly and relational barriers of entry. These mentor-pupil relations determine rules of access which can be traced in the hierarchical composition of the counseling teams in inter-state disputes. For example, Ian
Brownlie mentored Alain Pellet in the Nicaragua case, propelling the latter as a tenor of the international bar. But this space is now also defined predominantly in charismatic terms sometimes doubled with family relations. 40 These high barriers of entry not only define a collective form of legitimacy based on reputation; they also fit with the definition by these professionals of the proper rules of the games of inter-state litigation. As indicated by a prominent member: 'to enter this universe, it is preferable but not essential to be good; what matters is to belong to the small circle of renown (counsels) … you have to know the rules of the game … it is absolutely essential to have a mentor.' 41 The ICJ gained renewed prominence as the world court following the Nicaragua decision states. 50 For its part, international commercial arbitration was sidelined in the oil disputes triggered by decolonization between newly independent states and Western corporations. 
FROM THE GROWTH CRISIS OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TO THE

RESTRUCTURING OF THE MARKET FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
Somewhat surprisingly, the two institutions that have emerged since the turn of the 2000s as the 'two major players' 54 of the thriving market for investment arbitration -the ICSID and the PCA -had both remained dormant for decades. 55 The explosion of international investment agreements 56 certainly contributed to the growth of investment treaty arbitration, as did the Argentina debt crisis of the end of the 1990s. 57 Tracing the strategies pursued within these two institutions and the professional composition of the market for investment arbitration underlines that this growth built out of two apparently contradictory drivers: the dynamic of the market for commercial arbitration, and the symbolic authority gained by the ICJ as the world court from the 1980s. While this suggests a growing convergence between the two sides of international justice, the empirical dynamics of this rapprochement seem to further consolidate a key driver in the growth of the market for commercial arbitration: multinational corporate legal firms. In this sense, the debated 'backlash' against investment arbitration 58 can be construed, rather, like a growth crisis that could indicate a wider restructuring of the marketplace for international justice. Yet, the Argentina cases and the legitimacy crisis of investment arbitration they have triggered, have been followed with a subtle and ongoing shift in the profile of arbitrators.
The boom of investment arbitration
International lawyers associated with the symbolic authority of the ICJ as the world court are thus increasingly appointed as arbitrators in disputes between states and investors. For example, the appointment, in the Argentina cases, of Georges Abi Saab at once 'an advocate for the periphery' 74 and a guardian of the legitimacy of public international justice played a symbolic role to signal that the ICSID had 'become more responsive to sovereign concerns.' 75 Characteristically, the current Secretary General of the PCA, Hugo Siblecz, has described this convergence as a 'cross-pollination' between the two sides of international justice, which he deemed a key condition to enable each to gain in symbolic authority. 76 Shifting the focus to the empirical drivers of this convergence highlights the acute professional competition it is fostering: the 'clash of ethos' between 'two epistemic communities along different lines,' namely corporate lawyers and public international legal scholars. 77 The drivers of this professional competition, however, seem to be moving 'the center of gravity increasingly (…) toward the commercial arbitration bar.' 78 Indeed, the learned practitioners of the ICJ are pulled into treaty investment arbitration under the impetus of multinational corporate law firms, which play the role of gatekeepers for access into the market for investment arbitration. 79 As noted somewhat scathingly by The biographical entry of one of them is a case in point. Now the managing partner of a major corporate law firm after serving as Attorney General and Chief Justice, his biographical entry also underscores that he is the best Asian specialist of international commercial arbitration.
These patterns could be an indicator of strategies of repositioning that are at once political and professional. This is particularly well illustrated in the case of Singapore, as the profiles of its arbitrators could reflect this state's strategic positioning as a new hub for commercial arbitration in Asia. More generally, however, the profiles of the arbitrators of new state entrants to the PCA and beyond, of new arbitrators selected in 2013 from the Global South, all underscore some level of skills and positions in corporate legal practice. With a tendency to be less multi-positioned, they thus more often come from legal practice rather than academia, and fewer have held high judicial or governmental functions at the domestic level. Rather, they tend to mention their arbitration experience at the national level, notably within Chambers of commerce, and especially at the international level within diverse arbitration forums: the ICC in Paris for a third of them, and for another third the ICSID, MERCOSUR and WTO panels. One could surmise from these profiles that these newcomers vie to enter the marketplaces for international justice more from a professional platform in international (corporate) law than as gentlemen politicians of law. This seems to be corroborated by their academic credentials, with an important proportion holding an LLM in corporate law from North-American law schools.
CONCLUSION
Where does international justice draw its authority in an international scene largely driven by self-regulated professional markets for the settlement of transnational disputes? To revisit this classical and ever more urgent debate, this article has underscored the characteristic of international justice as a market for symbolic goods in which there is a dynamic relation between the producers of international law -that is, professionals of international justice -and the users of international dispute settlement mechanisms. More than anecdotal, indeed, the social and professional characteristics of the professionals involved in these mechanisms could help account for the professional drivers -rules of the game and competition -that define the marketplaces for international justice. Beyond, the resources valued for access and status within these marketplaces -technical, scholarly, but also social, political or economic -could be an indicator of the interests, and with them, the credibility of international justice institutions among constituencies of users: not only states and corporations, but also professionals vying to enter these marketplaces. In doing so, this article has suggested a departure from existing accounts.
Considering international justice as a field emphasized how the institutional and professional segmentation of international justice between a public and a private side, and their growing convergence, can be related at once to professional competition and to wider structural changes on the diplomatic scene and the global economy.
In this social and professional history of international justice, the most striking shift is arguably the relative devaluation of scholarly capital and the prominence taken by corporate legal practice, and with it multinational corporate law firms, for access and status within the marketplaces of international justice. This growing prominence could be related to the contrasted relational dynamic of the marketplace for inter-state adjudication on the one hand, and that of commercial arbitration on the other, with their wider constituencies of (potential) users. The international bar of the ICJ developed into a restricted scholarly professional marketplace, built on mentor-pupil relations, a characteristic that was a crucial driver to foster the symbolic authority of the ICJ as the world court, but that rendered also this small market more vulnerable to external shocks, notably the competition of multinational corporate law firms. By contrast, the dynamic of the market for commercial arbitration builds on a very different engine of production and reproduction of the law: that of the Wall Street law firm, structured precisely to facilitate the circulation and accumulation of different forms of legal capital between scholarly knowledge, businesses and state power. This institutional structure seems all the better positioned, meanwhile, to adapt to the changing interests of states and corporations in the face of growing contests between corporations and states over core sovereign issues. Though symbolical, the transformation observed in the profiles of the national groups of arbitrators to the PCA seems to corroborate this shift, with national legal elites vying to enter the marketplaces for international justice more and more from corporate legal practice. Meanwhile, rather than a harmonization between rules and institutions of international justice, this growing prominence of multinational corporate law firms could be fostering the wider fragmentation of international law, by allowing for flexible, à la carte, and continuously adapting strategies of litigation.
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